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This paper analyses how increased integration and the ongoing enlargement of 
European Union’s internal market affected the performance of Swedish 
manufacturing firms. The pro-competitive effect of international trade, in terms of 
intensified import competition on domestic firms’ market power, has been 
investigated extensively at industry level. In contrast to previous studies, this 
analysis is based on detailed firm-level information. Import data are divided into an 
EU member group and a group of recently proved EU member candidates. It focuses 
on how imports from these groups, together with imports from other non-European 
trading partners, impact on firm profitability, while taking firm-specific efficiency 
effects into account. The findings are that import from the new EU-candidates seems 
to have a substantial disciplinary effect on Swedish firm profits, whereas import 
from EU-member countries only appears to have an impact on firms with large 
market shares and in highly concentrated industries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Import competition has been regarded as a disciplinary device to constrain 
market power of domestic firms. At industry level and within the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm, this disciplinary effect of imports on profit 
margins has been investigated extensively. For Sweden, there are two 
earlier studies, Stålhammar (1991) and Hansson (1992), carried out on 
manufacturing industries in the 1980s. Yet so far, as pointed out by Tybout 
(2001), only a handful of studies have tried to explain cross-firm variation 
in profits using a combination of industry-wide and firm-specific factors.
1 
This paper is based on a panel of firm level data on Swedish 
manufacturing for the period 1990-1999. The panel structure of the data 
has the advantage that it is possible to distinguish temporal fluctuations 
from cross-sectional variations in profit margins. Furthermore, firm level 
data provides a possibility to shed some light on the controversial question 
whether the often found positive correlation between profitability and 
concentration at the industry level is due to intra-industry efficiency 
differences, exercising of market power, or both. 
In the paper I use a conjectural variation model, where the idea is that 
firms’ conjectures concerning import penetration, and thus their reactions, 
differ with respect to the countries of origin. The import is divided into five 
different country groups to determine whether the strength of import 
discipline varies by the origin of imports. The European Union countries − 
as being Sweden’s most important trading partners − and the European 
Union candidates are of specific interest. Moreover, the interaction effects 
between industry level characteristics, such as import penetration and 
producer concentration, and firm-specific characteristics, such as market 
share, are examined in more detail. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
framework. Section 3 presents the data and gives some descriptive facts on 
the exposure and the development of foreign competition in Swedish 
manufacturing in the 1990s. Section 4 sets out the empirical specifications 




                                                 
1  See, e.g. Levinsohn (1993) and Roberts & Tybout (1996). However, their studies are 
all on less developed countries.   2
2.  A theoretical background 
 
This section aims to illustrate three major points. First, in the context of a 
closed economy, I compare the price-cost margin expression at the firm 
level with the corresponding expression at the industry level. Second, I use 
a partial collusive model and introduce a distribution of firm level marginal 
costs to show how efficiency differences among firms within an industry 
are related to the industry level concentration ratio. Third, I apply the same 
partial collusive model to an open economy and allow imports from 
different country groups to have varying impact on price-cost margins. 
 
2.1 Firm level efficiency versus industry level concen-
tration 
 
In the classical tradition of industrial economics the industry or the market 
is the unit of study. Differences among firms are assumed transitory or 
unimportant. In general equilibrium industry profitability is assumed to be 
determined primarily by the ability of established firms to restrict rivalry 
among themselves and by protection through barriers to entry. A key 
hypothesis is that higher concentration tends to raise industry-wide profits 
by facilitating collusion (Scherer & Ross 1990). To illustrate how 
concentration and firm-level efficiency affect price-cost margins, I utilize 
the model developed by Clarke & Davies (1982). 
Let us assume an industry in a closed economy with n firms that produce 
a homogenous good. The i:th firm has the following profit function: 
 
              () i i i i q c q q p − = π          n i ., . . , 1 =                                     (1) 
 
where  i π  is  profit,  i q  is output and  i c  is marginal cost of firm i. 
Marginal cost is assumed to be constant and all firms set the same price p 
on the homogenous good. 
The inverse demand function is: 
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The first-order condition for firm i’s profit maximization with respect to its 
output  i q  is: 
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Equation (3) is rewritten in term of firm i’s Lerner index  i L , which can 
be considered as a measure of its market power. 
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where the market elasticity of demand  () ( ) 0 / / > ∂ ∂ − = q p p q η  and  i λ  is 
firm  i’s conjecture about its competitors’ reaction to its output change. 
Equation (4) shows that at the firm level the Lerner index  i L  or the price-
cost margin PCM depends on firm i’s market share  q qi / . 
To describe firms’ conjecture in more detail, I follow Clarke & Davies 
(1982) where the conjecture is defined as: 
 
























         1 0 < ≤α                 (6) 
 
where  α  is a parameter indicating the degree of competition between 
producers;  0 = α  means that Cournot conjectures prevail, while perfect 
collusion is approached as α  tends to be 1. 
By using (6) in (5) I obtain: 
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and inserting (7) into (4) gives a new expression of firm i’s Lerner index 
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By multiplying each side of (8) with firm i’s market share and summing 
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where H is the Herfindahl index. We observe that at the industry level 
the Lerner index L or price-cost margin PCM is an increasing function of 
concentration, measured by the Herfindahl index, while at the firm level, in 
equation (8), the Lerner index  i L  (price-cost margin) is an increasing 
function of firm i’s market share. These are important characteristics of the 
theoretical model I will make use of in the specification of my empirical 
models. 
So far, I have assumed constant marginal cost for each firm. Suppose 
now that the marginal cost still is constant for each firm, but varies across 
firms. In other words, it means that there are cost/efficiency differences 
among firms within the same industry and I assume that the marginal costs 
at industry level have a distribution with the mean  c µ  and the variance 
2
c σ . 
Clarke & Davies (1982) have, within the theoretical framework above, 
shown that industry concentration, measured by the Herfindahl index H, 
and the price-cost margin are related to cost/efficiency differences at the 
industry level. To derive an expression of H, at first, I rewrite equation (8) 
   5
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Then I get the following expression for the price by summing (10) over n 
and rearranging 
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Substituting (11) into (10), which is then squared and summed, gives
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Equation (12), in combination with equation (9), shows that 
concentration (and price-cost margin) will be higher when cost/efficiency 
differences among firms, measured by the coefficient of variation of 
marginal cost 
2 2 2 / c c c µ σ ν = , are greater. This provides support for the 
argument that the positive relationship between industry profitability and 
market concentration may be explained by higher efficiency of the largest 
firms. 
 
2.2 A conjectural variation model for an open economy 
 
The model above gives some insights how concentration and variations in 
firm efficiency are related to price-cost margins. I will now extend the 
model to an open economy by introducing imports into the domestic 
market and allow the firm’s conjectures to vary depending on the origins of 
imports.
3 
Let us assume that the domestic market conditions are the same as in 
section 2.1, i.e. there are n domestic firms in an industry producing a 
homogenous good. However, now there are also foreign firms belonging to 
s different regional groups competing with the domestic firms on the 
                                                 
2 For more details see Clarke & Davies (1982). 
3 See Urata (1984) and Hansson (1992).   6
domestic market. The profit function of a domestic firm i ( ) , . . . , 1 n i =  is still 
described by equation (1), while the inverse demand function that the 
domestic firms face is modified into 
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where q is total quantity demanded, 
d
i q  is quantity produced by domestic 
firm i, and 
m
k q  is the quantity imported from region k. 
The first-order condition for a domestic firm i’s profit maximization with 
respect to its output 
d














































































                                                                                                    
                        
(14) 
 
The Lerner index at firm level  i L  (price-cost margin) can then be 
expressed as 
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i λ  is firm i’s conjecture about its domestic competitors’ response 
to its output change and 
m
k λ  is firm i’s conjecture about its foreign 
competitors’ in region k response to its output change. Likewise, as in 
section 2.1, I further specify the conjectures as   7















       for all  i j ≠  and  1 0 < ≤α                         (17a) 
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Substituting (17a) and (17b) into (15) gives another expression of the 
Lerner index (price-cost margin) at the firm level. 
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1
1 / , where  k m  is the 
share of import from region k  in consumption,  q q
m
k / ,  and 
d
i s  is the 
domestic firm i’s share of total domestic output, 
d d
i q q / . The larger the 
market share of firm i 
d
i s , the higher the PCM on firm level. We also notice 
that the market share 
d
i s   interacts with import competition  k m  in 
determining PCM. 
Summing over the n domestic firms in (18) gives the aggregated Lerner 
index. The weighted Lerner index L below equals the price-cost margin 
PCM at industry level. 
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2 . The larger the concentration H, the higher is the PCM at 







determine PCM. The larger the conjecture parameter  k ϕ , the less is the 
disciplinary effect of imports from region k. When trade barriers are 
reduced  k ϕ  will decrease; however, the competitive pressure imposed by 
imports may differ for imports originating from different regions, i.e.  k ϕ  
varies. Notice that impact of the share of import from region k in 
consumption  k m  on PCM is ambiguous. The net effect of  k m  depends on 
the degree of concentration H, the degree of collusion among domestic 
producers  α , and the competitive pressure of imports from region k  k ϕ .
4 
Yet, given the concentration H, the larger the competitive pressure from 
region  k relative to the competition among domestic producers, i.e. the 
larger  α  relative to  k ϕ , the more likely the imports from region k has a 
disciplinary effect on PCM. The equations (18) and (19) are key equations 









The data I use include firm-level data on profit, output, capital stock, 
employment and wage for firms with more than 50 employees in Swedish 
manufacturing for the period 1990-1999. This gives me a panel consisting 
of 3 197 unique firms belonging to 93 manufacturing industries at the 3-
digit level of the SNI92 classification. The coverage of the panel in terms 




                                                 
4 The sufficient condition for a disciplinary effect of imports  0 / < ∂ ∂ k m L  is that 
() k H H ϕ α > − + 1 . 
5 Table A1 in Appendix contain more detailed information on the panel. The firm data 
comes from Statistics Sweden’s compilation of firms’ annual financial reports.   9
Table 1   Import penetration from different country groups  
               1990 and 1999 
 
Country groups  1990  1999 
EU 14 members  0.33  0.37 
EU 10 candidates  0.01  0.03 
Japan & Asian NICs  0.06  0.04 
Other high-income countries  0.08  0.09 
    Other low-income countries  0.04      0.04 
All countries  0.52  0.57 
       Notes: Table A2 in Appendix gives a more detailed description of the 
       Countries included in each country group. 
 
The firm level data has then been linked to data on exports by 
industries and imports by industries and trading partners from Statistics 
Sweden. Table 1 shows the trends in the import share from various country 
groups of consumption in the 1990s.
6 We observe that Swedish 
manufacturing is highly exposed to import competition. More than half of 
the consumption of manufacturing products comes from abroad and the 
share has increased over the 1990s. Most of the manufacturing import 
originates from the EU member countries and the distribution of import 
shares among country groups has been relatively stable. Nevertheless, we 
notice a modest increase in the import shares from EU members and the 





4. Empirical  analysis 
 
Two basic types of empirical models are analyzed. To compare my result 
with earlier industry level studies, I start off in section 4.1, from a 
conventional industry level model. After that I proceed in section 4.2, and 
estimate a more appropriate firm level model, which enables me to control 
for and separate competition effects from efficiency effects. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Consumption = sales value + import − export.   10
4.1 The conventional industry-level model 
 
To determine the impact of import on profitability at industry level, I 
estimate the following regression equation (cf. equation (19)): 
 
() it i t it it ikt
s
k




/ ln     (20)                      
    
where  it PCM  is the price-cost margin in industry i at time t and is defined 
as (value added − payroll)/value added.  it IMC  is the same industry level 
measure of import penetration as discussed above, i.e. the import share for 
country group k in consumption.  it H  is the Herfindahl index.  it L K ) / ln(  is 
the logarithm of the capital stock per employee at industry level. Since the 
numerator of PCM consists of both pure profit and capital compensation, 
capital intensity is included as a control variable in the regression.  t DT  are 
year dummies and  i DI  are industry dummies defined at the 3-digit level of 
the SNI92 classification. 
In the model in equation (20) I allow for differences in the disciplinary 
effects of imports depending on the countries of origin, i.e. I let  k γ  vary 
between country groups k. To a large extent the integration among the 
present EU members has, due to similarities in income and factor 
endowments, resulted in increased intra-industry and intra-firm trade. One 
may therefore expect less competitive impact of imports originating from 
these countries than of imports from more dissimilar countries (Jacquemin 
& Sapir 1991). Of particular interest for the future European integration is 
the effect of imports from the recently proved EU candidate countries. 
Hansson (1992) found a quite large disciplinary impact of imports from 
Japan and Asian NICs on domestic Swedish manufacturing firms in the 
1980s. Is this a pattern we can observe also in the 1990s?  
These are the motives of why I have allowed for differential disciplinary 
effects of imports from the following five country groups: (i) EU14 
member countries, (ii) EU10 candidate countries, (iii) Japan and Asian 
NICs, (iv) other high-income countries, and (v) other low-income 
countries. As an alternative classification I merge EU14, Japan and Asian 
NICs, and other high-income countries into a high-income country group 
and EU10 and and other low-income countries to a low-income country 
group. 
   11
Table 2 shows the results from the estimations of equation (20). In column 
1 (without fixed industry effects) and column 2 (with fixed industry effects) 
the coefficient on total import penetration has the expected negative sign, 
but is insignificant. If imports, as in column 3, are divided into high- and 
low-income country groups and without fixed industry effects, imports 
from low-income countries has a negative and significant effect, while 
imports from high-income countries is insignificant. However, the 
significant effect of imports from low-income countries disappears if, as in 
column 4, fixed industry effects are introduced. Further division of imports, 
in column 5, into the five country groups, indicates that import from the EU 
candidate countries has a large negative and significant effect on industry 
level price-cost margins. This impact persists even when, in column 6, 
industry fixed effects are included. 
 As I pointed out above, return to capital is included in my measure of 
price-cost margins and accordingly the capital-labor ratio should be 
positively related to PCM. Another interpretation is that high capital 
requirements constitute an entry barrier. In all specifications the capital-
labor ratio coefficient has the expected positive sign and is highly 
significant. Furthermore, concentration, measured by the Herfindahl index, 
has always a positive effect, but is never significant.
7  
A methodological problem is the potential simultaneity between import 
penetration, concentration and profitability. High profits in an industry will 
attract foreign firms to enter the market and thus induce more imports. OLS 
estimates are therefore expected to be inconsistent and biased. 
Concentration affects PCM positively, but on the other hand, PCM may 
over time influence the concentration ratio; high profits may attract entry of 
domestic firms. A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test in columns 1, 3 and 5 show 
that the hypothesis that regressors are exogenous cannot be rejected for the 







                                                 
7 As a robustness check I replace the Herfindahl index with the market share of the 
largest four firms C4. This yields similar results, except that the coefficient on C4 is 
significant in specifications without industry fixed effects. Moreover, I have 
experimented with including industry level export intensities into the model. This 
additional control does not lead to any substantial changes in my original results.   12
Table 2   Determinants of price-cost margin at the industry      
               level   
 







    
Import penetration 
(High-income)     0.015 
[0.54] 
0.030 
[0.30]    
Import penetration 


























































Year  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry  dummies  no yes no yes no yes 
2 R   0.25 0.53 0.28 0.54 0.30 0.55 
















Notes: The Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests use lagged import penetration and Herfindahl 
indices as instrument for tests of endogeneity;  0 H : regressors are exogenous. Square 
brackets [ ] give White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. 
 
The penetration ratios from different regions can be highly collinear. For 
example, trade liberalization between EU member countries may divert 
trade from outside the EU to trade within the EU, the penetration ratios will 
then be negatively correlated. Alternatively, exchange rate fluctuations 
affect penetration ratios simultaneously, and cause them to move together. 
Calculations of variance inflation factors (VIF-test) show that 
multicollinearity is not a considerable problem in specifications without   13
industry fixed effects. The mean of VIF is at a low value of 1.62 and all 
individual VIF values are less than 2.
8 
Apparently, according to equation (19), import penetration may have a 
larger dampening effect on PCM in more concentrated industries. I 
examine this, as shown in equation (21), by inserting an interaction variable 
between import penetration and concentration  it ikt H IMC ×  in equation (20) 
and Table 3 presents the results. 
 
         . . .
1 1








k it H IMC H IMC PCM ϕ β γ α                           (21) 
 
 
In  Table 3 we observe that it is only import competition from high-
income countries (column 3) and the EU member countries (column 5) that 
have the expected impact on PCM in concentrated industries and this effect 
disappears in specifications with fixed industry effects (columns 4 and 6). 
To evaluate the varying impact of import penetration on PCM in more or 
less concentrated industries, I calculate the marginal effect of increased 
import competition on PCM. Disregarding the possibility that import 
competition affects concentration, we may derive the expression for 







ϕ γ + =
∂
∂
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By using the estimate of  k γ  and  k ϕ  in Table 3 and the average 
concentration ratios in the first and the third quartiles of the industry 
distribution of the Herfindahl index I get values of the marginal effect of 




                                                 
8 According to rules of thumb applied to VIF, there is evidence of multicollinearity if 
the largest VIF is greater than 10 and the mean of all VIFs is considerable larger than 1 
(Chatterjee, Hadi & Price 2000). 
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Table 3  Interactions between import penetration and concen-
tration at industry level 
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Import penetration 
(High-income)     0.096 
[3.09] 
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[0.65]    
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Import penetration × H 
(Low-income) 
   0.832 
[2.54] 
0.256 
[0.65]    
Import penetration × H 
(EU14) 




Import penetration × H 
(EU10) 




Import penetration × H 
(Japan & Asian NIC) 




Import penetration × H 
(Other high-income) 




Import penetration × H 
(Other low-income) 


















2 R   0.25 0.53 0.30 0.53 0.31 0.54 
Observations  849 849 849 849 849 849 
 
Notes:  Square brackets [ ] give White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. 
Capital-labor ratios and time dummies are included in all specifications. Columns 2, 4 
and 6 contain industry fixed effects.                        15
Table 4  Marginal effects of import penetration from different  
country groups in high and low concentrated industries 
 
Country group  High concentration 
(third quartile = 0.16) 
Low concentration 


























Table 4 demonstrates that the result I obtained earlier in Table 2 appears 
to hold when interactions between import penetration and concentration are 
taken into account. The disciplinary effect of imports on industry level 
price-cost margins comes from imports originating from low-income 
countries and the EU candidate countries. 
 
 
4.2   Firm-level analysis: Market power or efficiency? 
 
As I mentioned above, the most important reason for using firm level data 
is to control for and separate competition effects and efficiency effects. As 
shown by equation (18) and as argued by, e.g. Tybout (2001), higher 
profits do not necessarily only reflect deficient competition pressure. High 
profits may also be due to higher efficiency or large sunk cost. Firm level 
analysis provides a possibility to distinguish whether the profitability of a 
firm is correlated with its efficiency and lead to a larger market share, or 
whether profitability, as a result of oligopolistic coordination between firms 
within industries, is correlated with concentration, or both. 
To determine the impact of imports on profitability on firm level I 
estimate the following regression equation (cf. equation (18)): 
 
() it jt jt jit
s
k






                                    + jit i t DI DT ε λ λ + + 2 1                                                               (23)   16
where  jit PCM  is the price-cost margin of firm j, in industry i at time t and 
ikt IMC  is the same import penetration variable as in the industry level 
analysis above.
9  jit S  is firm j’s market share, i.e. its share of production in 
industry  i at time t. Following Scherer & Ross (1990) and Roberts & 
Tybout (1996), I specify a non-linear relation between market share and 
PCM by also adding a quadratic term of market share ()
2
jit S .  () jt L K / ln  is 
the logarithm of firm j’s capital-labor ratio.  jt Firm  and  it Industry  are vectors 
of firm and industry level control variables. 
As firm level control variables, I include relative total factor productivity 
jit RTFP  and the export to shipment ratio (export intensity)  jt EXS . Higher 
productivity (efficiency) relative to other firms within the same industry 
may lead to lower costs and, as shown by equation (18), to a higher price-
cost margin. Previous studies have argued that the firm’s market share  jit S  
will pick up the efficiency effect. I maintain that  jit RTFP  is a more precise 
measure of efficiency.
10 Adding the export intensity may be justified if the 
margins on domestic and export sales differ since a firm’s price-cost 
margin is a weighted average of these. The export share affects the PCM of 
the firm if the firm is able to segment markets and price discriminate. 
Whether prices and margins will be higher on the export market depends 
on the relative elasticity of demand for the firm’s product at home and 
abroad. This means that we cannot a priori determine the sign of the effect 
of the export share on PCM. 
The results of the firm level analysis in Table 5 point out that the 
disciplinary effect of imports from low-income countries, or more 
specifically, from the EU candidate countries remain negative and 
significant. Moreover, and in contrast to the industry level analysis in Table 
2, the imports from Japan and Asian NIC turn out to be negative and 
significant. 
The market share appears, at least in columns (3) and (5) where I do not 
control for fixed industry effects, to have the expected positive effect, 
although at a diminishing rate. Other firm level controls, such as capital 
and export intensity have positive and significant effects on PCM, which  
                                                 
9 Import penetration can only be observed at the industry level so when firm level data 
is used the import penetration variable takes the same value for firms within same 
industry. 
10 Relative total factor productivity 
jit RTFP  is defined as the ratio of TFP in firm j to 
average TFP in industry i at time t. Hansson & Lundin (2003) Appendix 2 gives a 
detailed description of how TFP has been calculated.   17
Table 5  Determinants of price-cost margins at the firm level 
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Year  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry  dummies  no yes no yes no yes 
2 R   0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 

























Notes: In an alternative base specification industry-level annual sale growth is used as 
proxy for demand growth. This additional control is not significant in any specification 
and does not lead to any noticeable change in the results. Standard errors are adjusted 
for both heteroskedasticity and potential dependency among firms in the same industry. 
Due to collinearities detected among instruments industry dummy variables are dropped 
as instruments in the Hausmans specification test.   18
confirm the hypothesis that capital intensive and exporting firms have 
higher profits. Interestingly, the coefficient on relative TFP is positive and 
significant in all specifications. This indicates that more efficient firms 
have higher profits. 
A notable difference between the industry- and the firm level analyses is 
that adjusted 
2 R  is considerably lower in the firm level analysis (0.03 
compared to 0.55), which is not unusual in this kind of structure-conduct 
studies using micro-level data.
11 Contrary to the industry-level analysis, 
industry dummy variables contribute virtually nothing to the explanation of 
PCM in firm-level analysis. This is also consistent with what most other 
similar studies have found.
12 Hence, for brevity, I will in the subsequent 
firm level analysis exclude the results from specifications with industry 
dummy variables. 
A methodological problem needed to be discussed once again is 
simultaneity. Using additional firm-level controls provides a possibility to 
separate efficiency effects from import disciplinary effects. Nevertheless, 
this new possibility can also convey simultaneity between PCM and those 
firm level control variables, and even with industry level variables in those 
specifications.  I estimate all specifications with IV regressions by GMM 
using lagged values as instruments for suspected endogenous variables and 
compare the coefficients with the standard OLS coefficients. Both 
Hausman test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman test are reported, and both tests 
consistently indicate that regressors are exogenous and OLS can be used as 
the more efficient estimator. 
Measurement error is another well-known problem in structure-conduct 
studies. The results in Table 5 would be more convincing if they are robust 
to the use of alternative measures of the variables. Re-estimating the same 
firm-level models as in Table 5, but instead of PCM, I use operating 
surplus divided by turnover as measure of excess profit and replace import 
penetration ratios with import shares and these robustness checks yield 
very similar results.
13 
Finally, I ask if import has a larger disciplinary effect on larger firms? 
Are firms with a dominant market position affected more by import 
competition? To answer these questions I include in equation (23) an 
interaction variable between import penetration from different country  
 
                                                 
11 Cf. Roberts & Tybout (1996) and the various country studies therein. 
12 See the previous footnote. 
13 See Appendix Table A3.   19
Table 6  Interaction  between  import penetration and firm 
market share 
 









































Year dummies  yes 
Industry dummies  no 
2 R   0.02 
Observations 15264 
VIF-test 2.28 
Hausmans specification test  p-value: 0.18 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test  p-value: 0.84 
 
Notes: In all specifications, the Herfindahl index is included as industry level control. 
Capital intensity, market share, relative TFP and export intensity are added as firm level 
controls. All the firm-level variables have positive and significant effects on firm-level 
PCM. The coefficient on the Herfindahl index is positive, but never significant. In 
instrument variable regressions, penetration ratio, market share, relative TFP and export 
intensity are treated as potentially endogenous variables and lagged values are used as 
instruments. Standard errors are adjusted both for heteroskedasticity and potential 
dependency. As a robustness check all specifications are also estimated by using the 
four-firm concentration ratio C4 as the measure of industry concentration and gives 
similar results. 
   20
groups with firm level market shares  jit ikt S IMC × .
14 The key parameters are 












ikt k jit S IMC S IMC PCM ϕ β γ α             (24) 
 
countries the result indicates the opposite. However, there is a large 
negative and significant effect of import penetration separately, which is 
consistent with the result I obtained in the specification without interaction 





5. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has examined how price-cost margins in Swedish manufacturing 
are affected by the increased international integration in the 1990s, in 
particular the launch and the ongoing enlargement of the European Union’s 
internal market. The results, from both the industry level and the firm level 
analyses, show that import penetration from low-income countries, and 
more specifically, from the EU candidate countries has a disciplinary effect 
on price-cost margins. This outcome is robust to alternative profit and 
import competition measures. Moreover, the results indicate that the impact 
of import penetration from EU members on price-cost margins at industry 
level is higher in more concentrated industries. At the firm level, import 
penetration from EU members has a negative effect on profitability in firms 
with large market shares. This suggests that a disciplinary effect of import 
competition from EU members is felt among large Swedish producers. 
The hypotheses that concentration and barriers to entry facilitate firms’ 
opportunities to increase their mark-ups get somewhat mixed support. 
Capital requirements − an indicator of barriers to entry have a positive and 
clearly significant effect on profitability. The coefficient on the 
concentration ratio, on the other hand, is positive indeed, but rarely 
                                                 
14 This kind of interactions can also be thought of as allowing the regression coefficient 
to depend linearly upon other regressors. It can be an efficient way to capture the effect 
shifts among relative large number of heterogeneous firms. Interaction effects are also 
estimated for the total import penetration ratio and import penetration from high- and 
low-income countries. The results are not presented here but can be obtained upon 
request.   21
significant, especially if concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index. 
Yet, in the firm level analysis a firm’s market share is positively related to 
its profitability, which is consistent with the maintained idea that efficient 
firms are larger and have higher profits. 
An extension of earlier studies is that a firm-specific efficiency variable 
− firm’s relative productivity performance measured by total factor 
productivity TFP − is included into the analysis. This additional firm 
control variable has the expected positive effect on profitability, which 
confirms that more efficient firms have higher profits. Interestingly, after 
this efficiency related variable has been included, the firm’s market share 
still remains to have an effect on the firm’s price-cost margin. A possible 
interpretation is that, while the concentration ratio reflects potential implicit 
collusion at the industry level, the market share may capture a single firm’s 
prospect to exercise market power. Thus, the result point to that, given that 
efficiency related differences among firms are taken into account, large 
Swedish manufacturing firms appear to take advantage of their market 
power. 
In sum, the results from the industry- and the firm level analyses are not 
contradictory, rather complementary. The evidence of pro-competitive 
effects of import competition can be observed from the direct effect of the 
penetration from EU candidate countries or from the indirect effect of the 
penetration from EU members through an interaction with concentration 







Chatterjee, S., Hadi, A.S. & Price, B. (2000), Regression analysis by     
example. Third edition, New York:  John Wiley & Sons.  
Clarke, R. & Davies, S.W. (1982), “Market structure and price-cost 
margins”,   Economica, 49, 277-288 
Hansson, P. (1992), “The discipline of imports: The case of Sweden”,     
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 94, 589-597. 
Hansson, P. & Lundin N.N. (2003), “Export as an indicator on or promoter 
of successful Swedish manufacturing firms in the 1990s”, FIEF 
working paper no 188.   22
Jacquemin, A. & Sapir, A. (1991), “Competition and imports in the 
European Market”, in Venables A. & Winters L.A. (eds.). European 
integration: Trade and industry. Cambridge: Cambridge university 
press. 
Levinsohn, J. (1993), “Testing the import-as-market-discipline hypothesis”,  
Journal of International Economics, 35, 1-22. 
Roberts, M.J. & Tybout, J.R. (eds.) (1996), Industry evolution in 
developing countries: Micro patterns of turnover, productivity and 
market structure. Oxford: Oxford university press. 
Scherer, F. M. & Ross, D. (1990), Industrial market structure and 
economic performance. Third edition, Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company. 
Stålhammar, N.O. (1991), “Domestic market power and foreign trade”, 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 9, 407-424. 
Tybout, J.R. (2001), “Plant- and firm-level evidence on ‘new’ trade 
theories”, NBER working paper no 8418. 
Urata, S. (1984), “Price-cost margins in an oligopolistic market”, Economic 
Letters, 15, 139-144. 
 
   23
Appendix 
 
Table A1  Panel information 
 
  Year    Number of firms 
 1990    1921 
 1991    1853 
 1992    1706 
 1993    1542 
 1994    1551 
 1995    1623 
 1996    1696 
 1997    1674 
 1998    1737 
 1999    1755 
Total number of firm-years:17058 
 
 
 Years in the 
panel 
  Number of firms  
 10    816 
 9    150 
 8    135 
 7    161 
 6    173 
 5    174 
 4    232 
 3    348 
 2    453 
 1    555 
















   24
Table A2  Country classification 
 














Belgium Czech  Republic Japan  Australia  Mexico 
Denmark Estonia  Taiwan  Canada  Bulgaria 
Germany Cyprus  Hong  Kong  Iceland  Turkey 
Greece  Latvia  South Korea  New Zealand  Romania 
Spain Lithuania  Singapore  Norway  Other  low-
income 
France Hungary   Switzerland  countries 
Ireland Malta    United  States   
Italy Poland      
Luxembourg Slovenia       
The Netherlands  Slovakia       
Austria        
Portugal        
Finland        
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Table  A3    Robustness check using different profitability and   
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Year  dummies  yes yes yes  yes 
Industry  dummies  no no no  no 
2 R   0.03 0.03 0.03  0.02 
Observations  15264 15264 15264  15264 
 
Notes: In specification (1)-(3) I use an alternative profit measure PROFIT, operating 
surplus divided by turnover. The dependent variable in specification (4) is the usual 
price-cost margin PCM, while the import penetration ratios are replaced with import 
shares. Working Paper Series/Arbetsrapport 
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